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Abstract
We show that securities issued by a distressed firm, often through exchange offers, provide
the most efficient resolution of financial restructuring. Information asymmetry between the
firm-bank coalition and small bondholders gives rise to other forms of distress resolution
such as refinancing, public workout, and the inefficiency of liquidation. We find that political
lobbying by the firm-bank amplifies these inefficiencies and inhibits the development of private
market for distressed securities. Cross-country evidence is consistent with this and indicates
that improved creditor rights, and information facilitating credit bureaus interact in reducing
the likelihood of inefficient distress resolution.
Key words: Bankruptcy, exchange offers, political connections, lobbying, asymmetric in-
formation. D82, G33, G30, K49
1 Introduction
A large literature has documented inefficiencies in the bankruptcy procedures of many emerging
economies, which consume time and entail large costs for stakeholders. While the average time
for resolution in court supervised bankruptcy is 20 months in the US, it ranges from 3 to 7 years
in countries such as Peru, Mexico, Thailand, and India.1 The literature on debt enforcement
attributes long delays and high costs of resolution to macro factors such as poor creditor’s rights,
legal origins, state of economic development, and lack of developed financial markets.2
∗We thank Andres Almazan, Pinaki Bose, Thomas Chemmanur, Denis Gromb, and Adolpho De Motta. We are
solely responsible for any errors.
1According to the World Bank survey of Doing Business (2012), it takes 1.9 years on an average for the OECD
countries to resolve the process of bankruptcy, and the rest of the world average is 2.9 years. See Claessens and
Klapper (2003) for insolvency in a large number of countries.
2See, Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper (2003), Claessens and Klapper (2003), and Djankov et al. (2008) among
many others.
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Recent work on bankruptcy and financial distress links these macro factors to the political
connection of firms in many of these countries. Politicians often sit on the board of directors,
receive campaign financing and gifts, and in return favor their patron firms. Corruption in the
judicial system is also reportedly rampant.3 These connected firms, as this literature documents,
spend resources to capture politicians and the judiciary. They use political connections to by-pass
laws and obtain bailouts, and receive other special treatment such as cheap financing, deferred
repayments, etc. Numerous country specific and cross country studies have confirmed widespread
prevalence of such phenomena, especially in many emerging market economies with weak legal
regimes.4
The literature treats political connections as an instrument for rent seeking in generic circum-
stances, including in financial distress. However, financially distressed firms and their creditors
routinely renegotiate debt privately and this renegotiation is subject to ratification by bankruptcy
courts.5 The possibility of rent seeking during bankruptcy under a public workout, may have
substantial implications on the efficiency and the distribution of surplus between the stakeholders
during private workout.
We model a firm that has defaulted on current outstanding obligations to dispersed public
bondholders and to a large debt holder (bank). The firm also has a potential project with positive
NPV, which can be initiated only after disputes regarding payments of public debts are settled.6
The firm-bank coalition renegotiates the unpaid debt with diffused bondholders and offers alter-
natives to bankruptcy.
The firm-bank coalition can (a) either refinance public debt (b) or issue new securities in
exchange of the public debt, known as an exchange offer7, which offers a lower payment to bond-
holders but makes the new claims senior to the bank debt. The bondholders (i) either tender their
old security and subscribe to the new one or (ii) resort to public workout, which is a restructuring
process supervised by the court. We model the latter as a process that can be influenced through
3See Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2006), and Shleifer and Vishny (1994).
4See Brown and Dinc¸ (2005), Faccio and Lang (2002), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnel (2006), Faccio (2006),
Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Khwaja and Mian (2005), La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer (2002),
Sapienza (2004),and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) among many others for the link between political connections and
favoritism, including bail outs in financial distress.
5See, Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), Hotchkiss et al. (2007), and Senbet and Seward (1995), for the details
on the private negotiations under the supervision of courts. In the US this is known as pre-pack or prepackaged
bankruptcy (Baird and Rasmussen 2003). Although there is cross country variation, intervention by courts in private
negotiations are more frequent in other countries than in the US. See Djankov et al. (2008) for the experiences in
other countries.
6In most countries, the law prohibits carrying out new projects without settling the dues of the public debt
holders. For example, in the US, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 explicitly prohibits this practice.
7Exchange offers of various types are widely used in practice because they act as powerful tools in liability
management. They reduce immediate liability of cash strapped firms, allow the firms to continue, and secure a deal
for the bondholders that is preferred over public workout. A large number of academic studies discuss exchange
offers in the context of successful restructuring of financial distress. See surveys by Hotchkiss et al. (2007), and
Senbet and Wang (2010) for detailed empirical studies on exchange offers and Gilson (2012) for a very recent
experiences.
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lobbying.8
We find that exchange offers are the preferred mode of restructuring the firm’s debt since
they reduce the amount of funds currently needed by the firm to pay for short term obligations.
Moreover the exchange offer emerges as the unique equilibrium restructuring outcome when all
parties have symmetric information. Although the distribution of surplus tilts towards the party
with greater political connections, the mode of restructuring is unaffected.
Asymmetry of information arises when the probability of success for the new project is observed
privately by the firm-bank coalition but not by the bondholders. This leads to bargaining under
incomplete information where the bondholders (the uninformed party) do not accurately observe
their own outside option, which is the expected payoff from public workout. As a result negotiations
can sometimes fail. The game has two pure equilibria where negotiations succeed – (a) pooling
equilibrium where both high and low prospect firm makes the same exchange offer and (b) a
separating equilibrium where the high type makes an exchange offer and low type resorts to
refinancing. In addition to these equilibria there is also the possibility of the negotiations failing,
which triggers inefficient public workout with lobbying.
Our results show that the equilibria are ranked in terms of efficiency with the complete infor-
mation equilibrium being the most efficient, followed by the pooling equilibrium with exchange
offer, the separating equilibrium with refinancing, and finally the equilibrium where bondholders
at times choose public workout.
Our paper is related to the literature that explores the emergence of different kinds of bankruptcy
systems in response to informational or contracting frictions. Povel (1999) deals with the mech-
anism design approach and formulates “tough” or “soft” bankruptcy code to elicit interim infor-
mation from the entrepreneur about the continuation value of the firm. Ayotte and Yun (2009)
discuss the emergence of creditor friendly bankruptcy when judicial expertise is imperfect in an
incomplete contract environment. While these papers address the particular form of bankruptcy
system in response to information frictions or incomplete contracting, our goal is to explore how
such systems affect the outcome of private workout.
The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, connecting lobbying and (under)
development of the market for distressed securities is new to the literature.9 In particular we show
that in addition to increasing the relative payoff of the firm-bank coalition, political connections
impede the development of market based resolution of distress under asymmetric information.
Consequently our results show that lobbying through political or judicial connections magnify the
inefficiencies associated with informational asymmetry. This is in sharp contrast to the argument
8We will use the term “lobbying” to refer to the effort exerted to influence political institutions, and/or the legal
process related to matters of bankruptcy, to obtain a more favorable outcome.
9A recent paper by Bebchuk and Neeman (2010) is an exception. They develop a model that shows how
entrepreneurs, intermediaries and insiders of firms lobby for lower investor protection to extract rents in the context
of raising capital. Our paper is complementary to this as we investigate the effect of lobbying in the context of debt
renegotiations under bankruptcies while their paper focuses on raising capital.
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that such form of corruption may in fact increase efficiency in a second best world.10 Our results
complement the existing literature, which shows how free riding among the creditors, or coercive
exchange offers by the distressed firms, or asymmetric information act as barriers to successful
resolution under bankruptcy.11
Second, much of the current literature focuses on the decision of the stakeholders to use either
private negotiations or private workout (Hotchkiss et al. 2007) but recent empirical work shows that
parties in dispute use both forums (Gilson 2012). We show that the two methods of restructuring
are related because the public workout system acts as an outside option to bondholders who resort
to the judiciary when private negotiations fail. The act of lobbying in our model serves as an
instrument employed by the parties in a dispute to increase their pay-off from this outside option,
and is new to the literature.
Third, we provide new testable implications and find that our hypotheses are also consistent
with correlations we observe in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” dataset. In line with the
model we observe that the likelihood of inefficient piecemeal liquidation in the event of distress is
decreasing in credit rights and the degree to which information on firms is available in a country.12
More interestingly, as predicted by the model, creditor rights and the information availability
interact in reducing the likelihood of inefficient piecemeal sale.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we outline the basic model. We introduce
lobbying and its impact on the resolution of financial distress under symmetric information in
section 3. In section 4, the same analysis is extended to asymmetric information and link the
inefficient outcome to political lobbying, judicial inefficiencies and the strength of a country’s
disclosure laws. In the section 5, we take some of our testable hypothesis to data. The final
section concludes.
2 Model
The firm currently, in period 1, is in financial distress. The face value of the bank debt is B, which
is due in period 1. The total volume of public debt is D, of which λD is due currently at period
1 and the rest matures in the next period. The current assets of the firm of liquidation value L is
strictly less than the current liabilities B + λD.13 For simplicity we normalize L = 0.14
10See Bardhan (1997) for a discussion of the argument in favor of corruption based on the theory of the second
best.
11See Bruche (2011), Bris and Welch (2005), Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1995), Gertner and Scharfstein
(1991), and Giammarino (1989) among others. For good surveys see Hotchkiss et al. (2007), and Senbet and Seward
(1995) for the early literature.
12Additional empirical support for this comes from Djankov et al. (2008), and Hotchkiss et al. (2007).
13We could have made bank debt the senior most in liquidation (see Houston and James 1996, and Welch 1997),
while granting the bondholders the residual. Our analysis does not depend on this priority of claims.
14This is without any loss in generality because we assume that the NPV of the firm’s future project exceeds
liquidation value so that it is in everyone’s interest to restructure the firm. Our results will hold as long as the
expected pay-off in continuation exceeds the same under liquidation.
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The firm may be reorganized with the bank playing a governing role.15 We abstract away from
any agency issues that may arise between the firm and the bank and treat the firm-bank as a single
entity for our analysis. The process of reorganization consists of the initiation of a new project,
and (a) either full payment of current dues to the public debt holders (hereinafter referred to as
bondholders), or (b) a new payment plan offered by the firm-bank coalition and accepted by the
bondholders. This continuation project yields a stochastic return. There are three possible states16
that yield y2, y1, and 0 with probability tp2, p1 and 1− p1− tp2 and y2 > y1 > 0. To begin with we
assume that the bondholders and the firm-bank have symmetric information about returns. Later
we will assume that t is a realization of a random variable T and this will become the source of
informational asymmetry as the firm-bank will know the realization t whereas the bondholders
will not.
The continuation of the firm with the new project hinges on the successful private workout
between the firm-bank, and the bondholders and it involves one of two alternatives: either (i)
the bank refinances the current financial liabilities of the firm by repaying λD to the public
debt holders, and rolling over its own debt B, or (ii) the firm-bank coalition restructures the
public debt by making an exchange offer that will be described in the following sections in detail.
For expositional convenience, we assume that the continuation project does not require any new
investment and that all other assets of the firm, except the return yi, atrophy to zero by the end
of the second period.
The process of reorganization is risky as the new project pays off both public and private debt
in case of the realization of y2 but in all other scenarios, the cash-flow from the project is only
sufficient to cover the debt to the bondholders. To specify this inadequacy of y1, we assume that
0 < (1− λ)D < y1 < (1− λ)D +B < y2. (1)
This assumption implies that if the bank refinances and rolls over its own debt to the next period,
the firm defaults in discharging its debt obligations if continuation yields y1. We assume that,
in this case, the return is split between the firm-bank and the bondholders, with the share of
the latter being σ ∈ (0, 1). In our model this is the parameter that captures the degree to
which the bondholders are politically connected. Conversely 1− σ represents the relative political
connectedness of the firm-bank.17 If the bondholders and the firm are equally politically connected,
we will have σ = 1/2. Whenever the firm-bank is relatively more politically connected than the
bondholders we will have σ < 1/2. This formulation captures the idea that political connections
15The empirical literature documents the leading role played by banks during financial distress when a firm is
reorganized with a new project. They often bring in a new management team, have their representatives in the
board and closely monitor activities. See Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), James (1996), and Gilson (2012).
16We need at least three possible states of nature to introduce seniority in debt renegotiation explained below.
17During public workout parties can influence judges and politicians to grab the higher share by violating the
priority rules written in the original debt contracts. In this sense, 1− σ captures the political or judicial influence
of the firm-bank.
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increase the bargaining power of the politically connected party leading to a larger share of the
value of the firm in the event of distress. This often could result in the violations of APR (absolute
priority rule) in a weak legal regime where judiciary is vulnerable to political pressures. To focus
on the interesting case when the share of bondholders in the project returns in state y1 are not
sufficient to cover their dues. Hence we assume that σy1 < (1− λ)D.
3 Benchmark model with symmetric information
In this section all parties have symmetric information and a common prior about the cash flow of
the new project (yi), and the bank opts for continuation of the firm. The firm-bank can initiate
such a process only if it successfully restructures the public debt via one of the following methods
used widely in practice: 1. The firm-banks can offer a new security of lower payments but of higher
seniority in exchange for the existing bonds, or 2. It can repay the outstanding short term debt
of the bondholders and in each case, the bank rolls over its own debt to the next period. The
former is known as an ‘exchange offer’18 and the latter is often called the refinancing method. In
this section, we find out which of these two methods is more efficient and chosen by the firm-bank
coalition. We also examine whether this choice is influenced by each stakeholder’s bid for a higher
share of the pie in litigation. The timeline of events, drawn in figure 1, is as follows:
3.1 Timing
1. The firm-bank either refinances the short term public debt or makes an exchange offer to the
bondholders.
2. If an exchange offer is made, bondholders decide whether to accept or reject.
3. If the bondholders reject an exchange offer, litigation is triggered and parties choose their
effort to influence the pay-off in future bankruptcy.
4. If the offer is accepted, the parties settle.
5. The returns from period two are realized and divided between the bank and the bondhold-
ers. The division is either determined by the court if litigation was triggered at stage 3 or
according to the agreement reached at an earlier stage.
The time line of events above explicitly illustrates the occurrence of litigation and use of political
connections. This happens in stage 3 when bondholders reject the terms of the exchange offer. In
our model, political connections are used during litigation. We elaborate this below.
18Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), and Hotchkiss et al. (2007) for empirical and legal details.
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Firm-Bank
Settlement
Refinancing
Bondholders
Settlement
Accept
Litigation
Reject
Exchange Offer
Figure 1: Timing
The model can be solved backwards. First in section 3.2 we derive the payoffs from public
workout, that is, litigation. Using these, we can analyze the firm-bank’s choice of private workout
between refinancing and making an exchange offer.
3.2 Litigation
A key innovation of the paper is to link private workout to the judicial and political environment,
which each party could try to influence by spending resources. In case private workout fails,
bondholders (B) resort to both legal recourse, such as a class action law suit or winding up
proceedings, and also non legal means, such as lobbying through political connections. The firm-
bank (F ) coalition does the same.19 The expected pay-off of bondholders is
tp2D + p1y1Γ(xB, xF )− xB, (2)
and that of the firm-bank is
p2t(y2 −D) + p1y1(1− Γ(xB, xF ))− xF , (3)
where
Γ(xB, xF ) =
{
σ if xB = xF = 0
σxB
γ
σxBγ+(1−σ)xF γ otherwise, where γ ∈ (0, 1)
(4)
The expected payoffs of both parties have two components. The second part is affected by the
function Γ(xB, xF ),which is the standard “Tullock” contest function commonly used in the law
and economics, conflict, and political lobbying literature.20 Bondholders collectively spend effort
19The law suit is one example but parties could also spend resources to lobby their case by other means including
political pressure or bribing or engaging some other forms of corruptions such as bribery of judges or campaign
financing of politicians. See Dinc¸ (2005), Krueger (1974), and Rose-Ackerman (1999) among other examples cited
earlier.
20See Nitzan (1994), Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), and Hay and Spier (1998) for surveys.
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xB and firm-bank spends xF , in order to influence judges or politicians.
21 When xB = xF , the
probability of winning (or equivalently the share they are awarded) is σ and 1 − σ. The contest
function determines the payoffs only in statey1 where the new project has insufficient cash flow to
pay everyone. The first component is the pay-off when the new project is successful. In this case
the project has generated enough cash flow and bondholders receive full payments (both short and
long term). This specification of payoffs is consistent with the insolvency procedures of most of
the countries that order full payments due to bondholders when the project makes a turnaround.22
We can find x∗F and x
∗
B, the equilibrium efforts in court/connections by maximizing the two
objective functions. The first order conditions for bondholders and firm-bank are
p1(1− σ)σγy1 x
∗
B
γx∗F
γ
(σx∗B
γ + (1− σ)x∗F γ)2
= x∗B and (5)
p1(1− σ)σγy1 x
∗
B
γx∗F
γ
(σx∗B
γ + (1− σ)x∗F γ)2
= x∗F . (6)
respectively. This yields
x∗F = x
∗
B = p1(1− σ)σγy1. (7)
Note that the second order condition is satisfied since γ ∈ (0, 1). By substituting the equilibrium
efforts x∗F and x
∗
B from equation (7) into the litigation payoffs in equations (2) and (3), we find
the equilibrium litigation payoffs for the bondholders and firm-bank are
vLB = p2tD + p1σ(1− (1− σ)γ)y1, (8)
vLF = p2t(y2 −D) + p1(1− σ)(1− σγ)y1 (9)
respectively. Note, while σ stands for political connections, γ captures judicial inexpediency; an
increased value of γ forces both parties to spend more resources to obtain the same outcome. With
this set up, we compare the firm-bank’s expected pay-off under both refinancing and exchange offer
to find out its preferred mode of private workout.
3.3 Private workout
Given the payoffs from litigation, the firm bank decides between making an exchange offer and
refinancing the loan.
21We assume that the fragmented bondholders are united by a class action law suit and abstract away from free
riding issues of the kind famously highlighted in Olson (1965). The presence of the free rider problem would, in our
context, lead to an even lower payoff for the bondholders.
22It is natural to assume that in the event of success, debt is paid in full and the firm keeps the residual. See
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), and Djankov et al. (2008) for the informal description of bankruptcy processes around
the world.
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3.3.1 Refinancing
If the bank offers to refinance the firm’s debt, the firm-bank must pay the bondholders λD in the
first period, provided that it has raised the required amount. If it does, which happens with the
probability of (1 − G(λD)), the bank pays out the current obligations in full and the firm gets
out of bankruptcy and continues with the new project. All parties are paid after the realization
of cash flows from the new project in the next period. If the bank fails to raise the the current
outstanding amount due to bondholders (which happens with complementary probability), the
matter goes to the court where their pay-off, given by vLF and v
L
B derived in (9) and (8). Hence
the expected payoffs for the firm-bank and bondholders are
vRF = p2t(y2 − (1− λ)D) + p1y1(1− σ)− λD and (10)
vRB = λD + p2t(1− λ)D + p1σy1. (11)
The pay-offs reflect the fact that long term debt is risky and paid off fully only when the cash flow
from the project is y2,, and not otherwise.
3.3.2 Exchange offer
If the firm-bank chooses to make an exchange offer, it issues a new security whereby bondholders
receive αλD in the first period and α(1 − λ)D in the second period (with α < 1) in all but the
worst contingency where the cash flow is zero. Thus, in exchange of reducing a part of their total
debt, bondholders are made senior to the existing securities. The bank pays the promised amount
in the current period. The respective expected payoffs of the firm-bank (vEF ) and the bondholders
(vEB ) from the exchange offer are:
vEF = tp2(y2 − α(1− λ)D) + p1(y1 − α(1− λ)D)− αλD (12)
= tp2y2 + p1y1 − αD(λ+ (1− λ)(p2t+ p1)) (13)
vEB = αD(λ+ (1− λ)(p2t+ p1)). (14)
The firm-bank coalition offers α of senior debt for $1 of the existing debt of both maturities, and
postpones repayment of bank debt till period 2. Thus, in return for tendering their old bonds,
bondholders receive a package of new securities that enjoy more seniority in their future pay-off
but receive a lower cash payout in the current and future period.23 Hence, it relieves the distressed
firm of the liquidity problem (to the extent current payments to bondholders get reduced) and
23We make it clear that our results do not depend on the exact specification of the exchange offer described
above. We could proceed with an optimal design of this new security where current bondholders receive a smaller
amount of cash today in exchange for a higher amount in securities designed optimally by the firm-bank coalition.
Instead the current specification follows from widely prevalent practice in bankruptcy. See Altman and Hotchkiss
(2006), Hotchkiss et al. (2007), and Senbet and Wang (2010)
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such an exchange offer will not violate the terms of laws such as the Trust Indenture Act in the
US if the new bonds are offered without extinguishing the old bonds. However, the success of
an exchange offer depends on its acceptability to bondholders, which in turn, depends on the the
terms of the offer captured by α, which is determined endogenously.
Proposition 1. The firm-bank strictly prefers restructuring of the public debt via an exchange
offer to direct refinancing.
Proof of Proposition 1. The outside option of bondholders if they reject an exchange offer is vLB.
Since the firm-bank makes a take it or leave it offer, the bondholders are pushed to their outside
option and thus in equilibrium,
vLB = αD(λ+ (1− λ)(p2t+ p1)) =⇒ α(t)D =
p2tD + p1σ(1− (1− σ)γ)y1
λ+ (1− λ)(p2t+ p1) (15)
Plugging back α(t) we find
vEF = p2t(y2 −D) + p1(1− σ)(1 + σγ)y1. (16)
For banks to strictly prefer an exchange offer we must have vEF > v
R
F defined in equation (10).
Using these expressions and comparing them, we have:
vEF > v
R
F (17)
⇔ p1y1σγ +Dλ(1− p2t) > 0 (18)
From the inequality in (18) we find that exchange offer dominates the refinancing.This is because
it lowers the overall expected payment to the bondholders as it allows the firm-bank to squeeze
the bondholders to the least possible payment that makes them indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the offer.
The bondholders’ gains depend on their reservation payoff from litigation, which is decreasing
in 1−σ, the degree of political connection of the firm-bank. Note that with complete information,
although an increase in σ increases the equilibrium payoff of the bondholders, there is no impact
on the choice of restructuring method.
Note that
∂α(t)
∂t
=
p2(1− α(t)(1− λ))
λ+ (1− λ)(tp2 + p1) > 0 (19)
and this implies that the size of α is increasing in the productivity of the firm. As t increases, the
litigation payoffs of the bondholders increases, and this in turn improves what the firm-bank must
offer them to induce them to accept an exchange offer.
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Remark 1. The unique equilibrium with complete information is efficient.
The exchange offer made by the firm-bank is always accepted by the bondholders and therefore
litigation, the only source of inefficiency in our model, never materializes. As we will see in section
4, this is no longer the case when the firm-bank and bondholders are asymmetrically informed.
4 Asymmetric information
This section analyzes how the choice of restructuring is affected by lobbying efforts when the firm-
bank has more information about the project’s prospects than the bondholders. The situation
is worth exploring for two reasons: First, the bank being the large creditor, monitors the firm
closely and may gather information key to the project’s success which the dispersed bondholders
might lack.24 Second, it is well known that informational asymmetry of this type may lead to
failure of efficient bargaining, and in our context this may cause more expensive methods to
displace alternative cheaper methods of restructuring. We find that this is indeed the case and
that lobbying exacerbates the inefficiency by increasing the likelihood of the failure of private
workout. Hence, our plan in this section is (a) to characterize the set of pure equilibria25 and the
conditions under which the efficient ones are likely to prevail, and (b) to find out how lobbying
affects the inefficiency under asymmetric information.
The asymmetry of information is introduced in the model by allowing the firm-bank to privately
observe the realization of T at the start of the game, whereas the bondholders are uninformed. To
simplify things assume that the distribution of T is discrete and takes values t = τ where 0 ≤ τ < 1
and t = 1 with probability 1− θ and θ. Hence
E(T ) = τ(1− θ) + θ and E(T ) ∈ (0, 1). (20)
E(T ) is the prior belief of the bondholders about the state of the world. This may change in
equilibrium as the bondholders update their beliefs based on the offer made by the firm-bank.
In general the posterior belief will take some value Tˆ ∈ [τ, 1]. If the firm-bank’s action conveys
no information about T then the posterior belief Tˆ = E(T ) and will result in a pooling equilibrium
where all types choose the same method of restructuring. If the offer is fully informative and reveals
the true state of the world then Tˆ ∈ {τ, 1} and a separating equilibrium will prevail. We focus
naturally on the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium: The firm-bank observes the realization
of T and chooses between refinancing and an exchange offer. If it chooses to make an exchange
offer, it also decides on the size. Observing the firm-bank’s choice, the bondholders update their
beliefs to Tˆ , and choose their response.
24See, Hotchkiss et al. (2007) or Senbet and Seward (1995) for a very good review of asymmetric information
under financial distress.
25For simplicity we focus only on pure strategy equilibria.
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If the debt is refinanced, the bank pays off the current obligation of the firm towards the
bondholders. In this case the payoffs of the firm-bank and bondholders are
vRF (t) = p2t(y2 − (1− λ)D) + p1y1(1− σ)− λD (21)
vRB(Tˆ ) = λD + p2Tˆ (1− λ)D + p1σy1. (22)
Equation (21) represents the pay-off to the firm-bank from refinancing. This is the residual cash
flow after making full payment to bondholders if y = y2, and y1(1 − σ) when cash flow available
is less than payments due to bondholders. The bank’s offer to refinance the debt may signal
something about the true state to the bondholders. The bondholders update their belief to Tˆ .
Note that vRB(Tˆ ), the expected payoff of the bondholders when the debt is refinanced, is a function
of their belief Tˆ whereas the payoff of the bank is expressed as function of the true state since the
bank observes the realization of t.
If on the other hand the bank makes an exchange offer of size α, the payoffs are
vEF (α, t) = tp2y2 + p1y1 − αD(λ+ (1− λ)(p2t+ p1)) (23)
vEB(α, Tˆ ) = αD(λ+ (1− λ)(p2Tˆ + p1)). (24)
In equation (23) αD(λ+ (1− λ)(p2t+ p1) is the expected payment to bondholders from the firm-
bank’s point of view because it can observe its type. In the equation (24), this expected payments
to bondholders take the form of αD(λ + (1 − λ)(p2Tˆ + p1) where the term reflects the updated
belief Tˆ by the bondholders on firm-bank’s type upon observing the exchange offer. That is, the
bondholders observe α, compute their posterior belief Tˆ and decide whether to accept or reject the
offer based on whether the offer is greater than vLB(Tˆ ). An offer is accepted by the bondholders as
long as
αD ≥ v
L
B(Tˆ )
λ+ (1− λ)(Tˆ p2 + p1)
(25)
⇔ αD ≥ p2TˆD + p1σ(1− (1− σ)γ)y1
λ+ (1− λ)(Tˆ p2 + p1)
(26)
This shows that for α to be accepted by the bondholders it must be larger than their expected
payoff with litigation under the beliefs that are induced by the offer.
If the bank makes an offer that is rejected by the bondholders their payoffs are
vLF (t) = p2t(y2 −D) + p1(1− σ)(1− σγ)y1 (27)
vLB(Tˆ ) = p2TˆD + σ(1− (1− σ)γ)p1y1. (28)
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4.1 Characterizing the equilibria
The following lemma will be useful in characterizing the set of equilibria.
Lemma 1. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a high type firm-bank must make an exchange
offer that is accepted by the bondholders.
Proof. Proof in the appendix.
Using this lemma we can restrict our attention to equilibria where the high type-firm bank
makes an exchange offer. We are now ready to state our characterization result.
Proposition 2. The pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria can be characterized as follows.
1. If vRF (τ) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)} then there exists a separating equilibrium where high
types makes and exchange offer that is accepted and low type refinances the debt.
2. If vEF (α(E(T )) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vRF (τ)}, then there exists a continuum of pooling equilibria where
both high and low types make the same exchange offer that is accepted.
3. If vLF (τ) ≥ max{vRF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)}, then there exists a separating equilibrium where high
type makes an exchange offer that is accepted and low type makes an exchange offer that is
rejected.
Proof. See appendix for the full description of the three types of equilibria and the proof of exis-
tence.
First, the separating equilibrium where the low type offers refinancing and the high type makes
an exchange offer. Second, a class of pooling equilibria where both types make the same exchange
offer that is accepted by the bondholders. And third, the inefficient separating equilibrium where
a high type makes an exchange offer that is accepted and a low type makes a low exchange offer
that is rejected by bondholders triggering litigation. The separating equilibria emerge when a low
type firm needs to make too high an exchange offer that they prefer refinancing or litigation. The
opposite situation arises when high and low type make a pooling offer that is accepted by the
bondholders.
Remark 2. Refinancing is preferred over exchange offers only when there is asymmetry if infor-
mation between firm-bank and the bondholders.
Unlike the game of complete information, we find that refinancing arises in equilibrium with
incomplete information. Consequently we are more likely to observe exchange offers in countries
with mechanisms to ensure symmetry of information between borrowers and lenders. This proposi-
tion is consistent with the stylized fact that exchange offers are typically observed only in advanced
jurisdictions such as the US where strength of disclosure laws is greater.26
26See See Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), Hotchkiss et al. (2007), Senbet and Wang (2010)
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Next we look at how these equilibria compare in terms of efficiency and how a change in the
underlying parameter σ affects the existence of these equilibria. Note that the equilibrium efforts
that the bank and bondholders exert in court are uncontaminated by informational asymmetry
on T . This is because the probability with which output y1 arises is independent of T . Hence
we still have x∗F = x
∗
B = p1(1− σ)σγy1. Consequently the sufficient statistic for inefficiency of an
equilibrium in our model is simply the probability with which litigation arises.
Remark 3. Litigation only arises with incomplete information.
This remark shows that it is possible to rank the equilibria in terms of the sum of the payoffs
for the two players. All equilibria where private workout succeeds are equally efficient – they differ
only in how surplus is distributed between the firm-bank and the bondholders. Inefficiency only
arises when private workout fails triggering litigation, and the parties resort to lobbying. This only
happens when the bondholders are asymmetrically informed about the continuation prospects of
the firm.
4.2 Lobbying, incomplete information, and inefficiency
The next two proposition connects the political connectedness of the firm-bank, and the project
prospects to the efficiency of the equilibrium that arises under incomplete information.
Proposition 3. There exists a σˆ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that vLF (τ) ≥ max{vRF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)} if
σ < σˆ.
Proof. Proof in the appendix.
Focusing on the incomplete information setting, proposition 3 analyses the parametric region
in which the inefficient litigation equilibrium exists. In particular it states that the likelihood of
observing the inefficient equilibrium where bondholders reject some exchange offers, is decreasing
in σ, the extent to which bondholders are protected, in case litigation is triggered. We have
assumed that σ ∈ (0, 1/2) where 1 − σ captures the political connections or judicial bias in
favor of the firm-bank. If σ = 1/2 the law treats the firm-bank and the bondholders equally.
This proposition implies that as we move to a regime where bondholder rights are protected, the
likelihood of observing the more efficient equilibria, namely the pooling exchange offer equilibrium
and separating equilibrium with refinancing, increases.
Assume that the bank privately observes the realization of T with probability 1 − q and with
probability q, both the bank and the bondholders observe the realization of T .
Proposition 4. Assume that the firm gets liquidated with some probability if it goes into litigation
yielding a payoff that is normalized to 0 for all parties. The likelihood of liquidation is weakly
decreasing in q.
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Proof. Proof in the appendix.
We find that the probability with which the firm is inefficiently liquidated is lower with complete
information compared to the pooling or separating equilibria under incomplete information. This
is because, knowing the exact litigation payoff of the bondholders the firm-bank coalition can make
the lowest possible exchange offer that is always accepted. Since q is the probability with which
the bondholders are informed, and consequently the game is one of complete information, it follows
that the probability liquidation is declining in q. We interpret q as the degree to which information
about firm prospects is available to the bondholder. In section 5 we attempt to investigate whether
this prediction is supported by data.
Remark 4. Incomplete information causes inefficiency as it increases the likelihood of liquidation.
Political connections further exacerbate this inefficiency since the likelihood of liquidation under
incomplete information is increasing in the political connections of the firm-bank.
Remark 4 summarizes the results in this section. Inefficient public workout in form of liqui-
dation is more likely when bondholders are asymmetrically informed. Moreover, the likelihood of
liquidation is even larger when bondholder rights are not protected against the possibility of the
firm-bank lobbying through its political connections or through influencing the judicial outcome.
In section 5 we attempt to investigate whether this prediction is supported by data.
5 Empirics
We have linked the probability of liquidation to political lobbying captured by σ, and the degree of
asymmetric information 1− q. The likelihood of inefficient liquidation is decreasing in σ and 1− q.
Moreover, we also predict that in addition to these direct effects, there is an additional effect of
the interaction of the two factors. In particular, as seen in remark 4, the model predicts that the
likelihood of liquidation is even greater when firms are politically connected and the asymmetry
of information between the firm-bank and bondholders is large. We use the World Bank Doing
Business Dataset,27 which comprises of cross section of 189 countries. We would like to emphasize
that this analysis is preliminary and merely suggestive of the fact that the key predictions of our
model are consistent with the data.
We regress
Yi =β1 + β2Creditor Bureau + β3Creditor Participation
+ β4Creditor Bureau*Creditor Participation + ε
(29)
where Yi is outcome of bankruptcy. This variable takes value 0 in case of liquidation and 1 in
case where the firm is allowed to continue into the second period. We use the resolving insolvency
27See table 6 for summary statistics. This dataset can be downloaded at http://www.doingbusiness.org
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outcome from the doing business dataset, which takes value 0 in case of piecemeal sale and 1 in
case the firm is sold as a going concern.
We use creditor bureau coverage as our proxy for q. Recall that q is the probability with
the prospects of the firm are common knowledge. Credit bureau coverage measures the number
of individuals and firms that are listed in a credit bureau’s database as a fraction of the adult
population. A credit bureau is defined as a private organization (for profit or not for profit) in the
financial system that facilitates the exchange of credit information. Greater credit bureau coverage
is likely to be associated with the bondholders having greater access to information about firm’s
past performance and consequently its productivity.
We use creditor participation at the insolvency stage as our proxy for σ. This index takes
values between 0 and 4 with higher values associated with more creditor rights at the insolvency
stage. These rights include the right to participate in selecting an insolvency representative, veto
rights in approval of sale of substantial debtor assets, right to access official records in insolvency
proceedings, and the right to object to the decision of the court or insolvency representative. A
higher score on this index would mean that the litigation game is not as biased in favor of the
firm-bank.
From proposition 4 we expect β2 > 0 since reduction in informational asymmetry should lead
to less liquidation. From proposition 3 we expect β3 > 0 as an increase in σ would lead to a
decrease in probability of observing liquidation. Finally, from remark 4 we expect β4 > 0. This
is the coefficient on the interaction between σ and q. A positive sign indicates that informational
asymmetry and lobbying power of the firm-bank complement each other in generating a higher
likelihood of liquidation.
Our regression result are presented in table 2. To begin with in column (1) we regress on
the resolving insolvency outcome on credit bureau coverage and find a positive and significant
relationship. In column (2) we control for log GDP per capita and find that the relationship
continues to be significant. In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the exercise with the creditor
participation index as our independent variable and find that there is indeed a significant positive
relationship between creditor rights and efficient resolution of insolvency. Columns (5) and (6) are
our main results where we regress the specification from equation (29).
Once the interaction term is included, the picture changes. We find positive and significant
estimates for β4 whereas estimates for β2 and β3 become insignificant. This is consistent with
the prediction in remark 4. These results suggest that the key prediction of the model, that the
inefficiency created by informational asymmetry is amplified by institutional bias in favor of the
firm-bank.
Note that the complete information equilibrium, the separating equilibrium with refinancing,
and the pooling equilibria with exchange offers from case 1 and 2 in proposition 2 never lead to
liquidation. To see this note that bondholders always accept the offer made by the firm-bank in
these equilibria. In this case, lobbying or informational asymmetry individually will not increase
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the probability of liquidation, since a higher probability of liquidation is only associated with
the litigation equilibrium in case 3 in proposition 2. Consequently we would need both factors,
that is informational asymmetry and lack of creditor rights, to come together for an increase in
liquidation. This is consistent with what we observe in columns (5) and (6) in table 2.
6 Conclusion
Several empirical papers, newspaper reports, and anecdotal evidence suggest that political lob-
bying for extracting rents takes up resources, particularly in emerging market economies with
underdeveloped legal and information facilitating institutions. In this paper, we examine a very
specific issue: the impact of political connections on the legal process of bankruptcy and we find
that it inhibits the financial market for distressed securities. First, it reduces the relative payoff
of small debt holders, and second, it amplifies inefficiencies associated with asymmetry of infor-
mation. In our model we have only focused on resolution of distress. An interesting question
for future work would be to trace the impact of distress resolution in the face of lobbying, and
informational asymmetries, on the depth of the debt market that emerges.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an exchange offer α(1) +  where  > 0. First consider the bondhold-
ers. For any belief Tˆ ∈ [0, 1], their best response to an exchange offer of α(1) +  is to accept.
This is because their payoff from rejection is vLB(Tˆ ) < v
E
B(α(1) + , Tˆ ). Hence in any equilibrium
bondholders must have the strategy of accepting an exchange offer of α(1) + .
Now consider the high type firm-bank. Note that vEF (α(1), 1) > v
R
F (1) always holds by proposi-
tion 1. Moreover vEF (α(1), 1) > v
L
F (1) is also true due to the inefficiency of litigation. This implies
that there exists an  such that α(1) +  is preferred by the firm-bank over refinancing, and also
over any exchange offer that is rejected by the bondholders.
Proof of proposition 2. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium must have three ingredients. First, the
bank’s offer must be optimal given the actions and beliefs of the bondholders. Second, the bond-
holders must update their belief using Bayes rule. And finally, the strategy of the bondholders
must be optimal given their beliefs and the action of the bank. We will now go through each of
these. We first fully specify the three equilibria and then prove their existence.
1. If vRF (τ) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)} then there exists a separating equilibrium where
• The firm-bank refinances the loan if t = τ and makes an exchange offer of
α(1) =
p2D + p1σ(1− (1− σ)γ)y1
D(λ+ (1− λ)(p2 + p1)) (30)
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if t = 1.
• Bondholders update their belief to Tˆ = 1 if in case of an exchange offer and update
their belief to Tˆ = τ in the event of refinancing
• Bondholders accept α ≥ α(1) and reject all other exchange offers.
2. If vEF (α(E(T )) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vRF (τ)}, then there exists a pooling equilibrium where
• The bank always makes an exchange offer of
α(E(T )) =
E(T )p2D + p1σ(1− (1− σ)γ)y1
D(λ+ (1− λ)(E(T )p2 + p1)) (31)
.
• Bondholders update to Tˆ = E(T ) on observing an exchange offer and Tˆ = τ in the
event of refinancing (off-equilibrium).
• Bondholders accept any exchange offer of α ≥ α(E(T )) and reject otherwise.
3. If vLF (τ) ≥ max{vRF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)}, then there exists a separating equilibrium where
• the firm-bank makes an exchange offer of α(1) when t = 1, and an exchange offer of
α(τ) when t = τ ,
• Bondholders update their belief to Tˆ = 1 in case of any exchange α > α(τ), and update
their belief to Tˆ = τ in case of α = α(τ) or refinancing.
• Bondholders accept the exchange offer of α(1) and reject all other exchange offers.
Case 1 vRF (τ) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)} Separating equilibrium with refinancing.
We will show that the separating equilibrium with refinancing exists as long as vRF (τ) ≥
max{vLF (τ), vEF (α(1), τ)}. Since the size of the exchange offer is increasing in t we have α(1) >
α(E(T )) and consequently, vEF (α(E(T )), τ) > v
E
F (α(1), τ). Hence v
R
F (τ) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)} =⇒
vRF (τ) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vEF (α(1), τ)}.
1. We first focus on deriving the optimal strategy of the bank for a given belief and strategy of
the bondholders. Assume that the bondholders always update to Tˆ = 1 when they observe
an exchange offer and Tˆ = τ when the bank refinances the loan. Consider the strategy for
the bondholders where they reject any α < α(1) triggering litigation and accept an offer of
α ≥ α(1). Given this strategy and belief of the bondholders consider the bank’s decision.
(a) When t = 1 the bank prefers to make an exchange offer of α = α(1) to a lower exchange
offer since all offers less than α(1) are rejected triggering the litigation payoff of vLF (t =
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1), which is dominated since
vEF (Tˆ = 1|t = 1) ≥ vLF (t = 1) (32)
⇔ 2p1y1σ(1− σ)γ ≥ 0. (33)
Also note that any offer α > α(1) leads to a strictly lower payoff for the bank and
is therefore strictly dominated by the offer of α(1). Moreover the payoff from making
an exchange offer of α(1) is greater than the payoff from refinancing the loan due to
proposition 1.
(b) When t = τ the bank receives a payoff of vRF (τ) when it refinances the loan as opposed
vEF (α(1), τ) which is the payoff from imitating a high type bank and making the exchange
offer of α(1). Since vRF (τ) ≥ vEF (α(E(T )), τ) > vEF (α(1), τ), this is dominated. Moreover
by vRF (τ) ≥ vLF (τ) we know that the bank prefers to refinance the loan rather than make
any exchange offer α < α(1) when t = τ and face litigation.
2. Next we examine what the equilibrium beliefs of the bondholders must be. The banks makes
an exchange offer of α(1) when t = 1 and refinances the loan when t = τ . Hence the
bondholders must update to Tˆ = 1 when the observe an exchange offer of α(1) and Tˆ = τ
when the bank refinances the loan. Beliefs for any exchange offer α 6= α(1) are for situations
that are off-equilibrium and we are free to specify them. We adopt the off-equilibrium belief
where bondholders update to Tˆ = 1 when the bank makes any exchange offer.
3. Next we derive the optimal strategy of the bondholders given their beliefs and the strategy
of the bank. The bank makes an exchange offer of α(1) when t = 1 and refinances the loan
when t = τ . It is an optimal response to accept the offer of α ≥ α(1) since rejection would
lead to vLB(1) and v
E
B(α(1)) = v
L
B(1). It is optimal to reject any exchange offer α < α(1)
since rejection would lead the bondholders to update to Tˆ = 1 and a litigation payoff of
vLB(1) > v
E
F (α).
Case 2 vEF (α(E(T )), τ) ≥ max{vLF (τ), vRF (τ)} Pooling equilibria with only exchange offers.
1. Assume that bondholders accept any exchange offer of α ≥ α(E(T )) and reject any offer less
than α(E(T )). They update to Tˆ = E(T ) when they receive an exchange offer and Tˆ = τ
when the bank refinances the debt. Since α(t) is decreasing in t, as long as banks prefer
to make the pooling exchange offer when t = τ , they will prefer the same when t = 1. For
t = τ , banks must prefer to make the offer of α(E(T )) any offer α < α(E(T )) that bondholders
reject since vEF (α(E(T )), τ) ≥ vLF (τ). Moreover at t = τ banks must prefer exchange offer
of α(E(T )) over making a refinancing offer sincevEF (α(E(T )), τ) ≥ vRF (τ). Finally an offer of
α(E(T )) dominates any higher offer.
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2. In equilibrium only exchange offers are made and bondholders correctly update to Tˆ = E(T ).
Off equilibrium bondholders update to Tˆ = E(T ) when they receive an exchange offer of
α 6= α(E(T )) and Tˆ = τ when the bank refinances the loan.
3. When the bondholders receive an offer of α ≥ α(E(T )) it is optimal to accept since rejection
induces the belief Tˆ = E(T ) and a payoff of vLB(E(T )) = v
E
B(α(E(T ))). Finally, it is optimal
to reject any α < α(E(T )) since it induces the belief Tˆ = E(T ) and leads to a litigation
payoff of vLB(E(T )) > v
E
B(α).
Let α := vEF (α, τ) = max{vLF (τ), vRF (τ)}. Any offer α such that α ∈ [α(E(T )), α] can be
sustained as a pooling equilibrium. This happens with the following off-equilibrium play – the
bondholders reject any α′ < α and update to Tˆ = τ . Hence there is a continuum of pooling
equilibria supported by different off-equilibrium beliefs.
Case 3 vLF (τ) ≥ max{vRF (τ), vEF (α(E(T )), τ)} Separating equilibrium with exchange offers and
litigation.
1. Assume that the bondholders always update to Tˆ = 1 when they observe an exchange offer
α > α(τ) and Tˆ = τ otherwise. Consider the strategy for the bondholders where they reject
any α < α(1) triggering litigation and accept an offer of α ≥ α(1). Given this strategy and
belief of the bondholders consider the bank’s decision.
(a) When t = 1 the bank prefers to make an exchange offer of α = α(1) to a lower exchange
offer since all offers less than α(1) are rejected triggering the litigation payoff of vLF (t = 1)
which is dominated since
vEF (Tˆ = 1|t = 1) ≥ vLF (t = 1) (34)
⇔ 2p1y1σ(1− σ)γ ≥ 0. (35)
Moreover the payoff from making an exchange offer of α(1) is greater than the payoff
from refinancing the loan due to proposition 1.
(b) When t = τ the bank makes an exchange offer of α(τ) and receives a payoff of vLF (τ).
Any exchange offer α ∈ (α(τ), α(1)) is rejected and yields the same payoff of vLF (τ) to
the bank. An exchange offer of α(1) yields a payoff of vEF (α(1), τ) and refinancing yields
a payoff of vRF (τ), both of which are lower than v
L
F (τ).
2. Next we examine what the equilibrium beliefs of the bondholders must be. The banks makes
an exchange offer of α(1) when t = 1 and an offer of α(τ) when t = τ . Hence the bondholders
must update to Tˆ = 1 when the observe an exchange offer of α(1) and Tˆ = τ when they
observe α = α(τ). The off-equilibrium beliefs for an exchange offer of α > α(τ) are assumed
to be Tˆ = 1, for any refinancing offer are assumed to be Tˆ = τ .
20
3. Next we derive the optimal strategy of the bondholders given their beliefs and the strategy
of the bank. The bank makes an exchange offer of α(1) when t = 1 and α(τ) when t = τ .
It is an optimal response to accept the offer of α ≥ α(1) since rejection would lead to vLB(1)
and vEB(α(1)) = v
L
B(1). It is optimal to reject the offer α(τ) since rejection would lead the
litigation payoff of vLB(τ) = v
E
B(α(τ)).
Now we show that these are the only three pure perfect Bayesian equilibria in the model. To
see this note that given Lemma 1 we can restrict our attention to equilibria where the strategy of
the high type is to make an exchange offer, and the strategy of the bondholders is to accept. This
allows for three possible pure strategies for a low type firm-bank – refinancing, pooling exchange
offers, and separating exchange offers
Proof of proposition 3. We can prove this by proving the two separate cases –
1. vEF (E(T ), τ) ≤ vRF (τ). In this case it is sufficient to show that the payoff from refinancing
decreases less for an increase in σ that than the payoff from litigation. To see this note that
∂vRF (τ)
∂σ
>
∂vLF (τ)
∂σ
⇔ −p1y1 > −p1y1(1 + γ(1− 2σ)),
(36)
since σ < 1/2.
2. vEF (E(T ), τ) > v
R
F (τ).
To see whether the vEF (α(E(T )), τ)− vLF (τ) is increasing in σ we differentiate with respect to
σ and find
∂vEF (α(E(T )), τ)
∂σ
>
∂vLF (τ)
∂σ
⇔ p1y1(1 + γ(1− 2σ)) > p1y1(1− γ(1− 2σ)) λ+ (1− λ)(p2τ + p1)
λ+ (1− λ)(p2 E(T ) + p1) .
(37)
The inequality in (37) always holds.
The monotonicity of the difference in payoffs in σ ensure that there’s a σˆ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that the
statement of the proposition holds.
Proof of Proposition 4. If the true t is revealed (this happens with probability 1−q), the bondhold-
ers play a game of complete information with the firm that has a unique equilibrium where they
are made an exchange offer that they accept (proposition 1). If the bondholders do not observe
t (this happens with probability q), the game is one of incomplete information. Since offers are
only rejected in the incomplete information environment, leading to liquidation, the probability of
liquidation is weakly increasing in q.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Resolving Insolvency Outcome 173 .265896 .4430916 0 1
Credit Bureau Coverage 189 28.13492 36.99146 0 100
Creditor Participation Index 189 1.624339 .9739371 0 4
Log GDP Per Capita 179 8.621906 1.472561 5.422547 11.61455
Resolving Insolvency Outcome takes value 0 for piecemeal sale 1 when going
concern is more common.
GDP per capita data is from the World Development Indicators, which is com-
puted in 2013 USD
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